The Guesswork problem was originally motivated by a desire to quantify computational security for single user systems. Leveraging recent results from its analysis, we extend the remit and utility of the framework to the quantification of the computational security for multi-user systems. In particular, assume that V users independently select strings stochastically from a finite, but potentially large, list. An inquisitor who does not know which strings have been selected wishes to identify U of them. The inquisitor knows the selection probabilities of each user and is equipped with a method that enables the testing of each (user, string) pair, one at a time, for whether that string had been selected by that user.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of systems is often predicated on a user or application selecting an object, a password or key, from a large list. If an inquisitor who wishes to identify the object in order to gain access to a system can only query each possibility, one at a time, then the number of guesses they must make in order to identify the selected object is likely to be large. If the object is selected uniformly at random using, for example, a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator, then the analysis of the distribution of the number of guesses that the inquisitor must make is trivial.
Since the earliest days of code-breaking, deviations from perfect uniformity have been exploited. For example, it has long since been known that human-user selected passwords are highly non-uniformly selected, e.g. [1] , and this is exploited in dictionary attacks. In information theoretic security, uniformity of the string source is typically assumed on the basis that the source has been compressed. Recent work has cast some doubt on the appropriateness of that assumption by establishing that fewer queries are required to identify strings chosen from the typical set than one would expect by a naïve application of the asymptotic equipartition property. This arises by exploitation of the mild non-uniformity of the distribution of strings conditioned to be in the typical set [2] .
If the string has not been selected perfectly uniformly, but with a distribution that is known to the inquisitor, then the quantification of security is relatively involved. Assume that a string, W 1 , is selected stochastically from a finite list, A = {0, . . . , m − 1}. An inquisitor who knows of the selection probabilities, P (W 1 = w 1 ) for all w 1 ∈ A, is equipped with a method to test one string at a time and develops a strategy, the order in which strings are guessed. As the string is stochastically selected, the number of queries that must be made before it is identified correctly is also a random variable, dubbed guesswork. Analysis of the distribution of guesswork serves as a natural a measure of computational security in brute force determination.
In a brief paper in 1994, Massey [3] established that if the inquisitor orders their guesses from most likely to least likely, then the Shannon entropy of the random variable W 1 bears little relation to the average number of guesses required to identify it, i.e. the expected guesswork. Arikan [4] established that if a string, W k , is chosen from A k with i.i.d. characters, again guessing strings from most likely to least likely, that the moments of the guesswork distribution grow exponentially in k with a rate identified in terms of the Rényi entropy of the characters. In particular, the average guesswork grows as the Rényi entropy with parameter 1/2, a value that cannot be smaller than the Shannon entropy of a character and is typically larger. Arikan's result was subsequently extended significantly beyond i.i.d. sources [5] , [6] , [7] , establishing its robustness. In the generalized setting, specific Rényi entropy, the Rényi entropy per character, plays the rôle of Rényi entropy. In turn, these results have been leveraged to prove that guesswork satisfies a Large Deviation Principle (LDP) in broad generality [8] , which provides direct estimates on the guesswork distribution. These deductions, along with others described in Section IV, have developed a quantitative framework for the process of brute force guessing a single string.
In the present work we address a natural extension in this investigation of brute force searching: the quantification for multi-user systems. We are motivated by both classical systems, such as the brute force entry to a multi-user computer where the inquisitor need only compromise a single account, as well as modern distributed storage services where coded data is kept at distinct sites in a way where, due to coding redundancy, several, but not all, servers need to be compromised to access the content [9] , [10] .
II. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION
Assume that V users select strings independently from A k . An inquisitor knows the probabilities with which each user selects their string, is able to query the correctness of (user, string) pair, and wishes to identify any U of the V strings. The first question that must be addressed is what is the optimal strategy, the ordering in which (user, string) pairs are guessed, for the inquisitor. For the single user system, since the earliest investigations [3] , [4] , [11] , [12] it has been clear that the strategy of ordering guesses from most to least likely string, breaking ties arbitrarily, is optimal in any reasonable sense. Here we shall give optimality a specific meaning: that the distribution of the number of guesses required to identify the unknown object is stochastically dominated by all other strategies. Amongst other results, for the multi-user guesswork problem we establish the following:
• If U < V , the existence of an optimal guessing strategy, one that is stochastically dominated by all other strategies, is no longer assured. • By construction, there exist asymptotically optimal strategies as the strings become long. • For asymptotically optimal strategies, we prove a large deviation principle for their guesswork. The resulting large deviations rate function is, in general, not convex and so this result could not have been established by determining how the moment generating function of the guesswork distributions scale. • The non-convexity of the rate function shows that if users' string statistics are distinct, there may be no fixed ordering of weakness amongst users; that is, depending on how many guesses are made before the U users' strings are identified, the collection of users whose strings have been identified are likely to be distinct. • If all V strings are chosen with the same statistics, then the rate function is convex and the exponential growth rate of the average guesswork as string-length increases is the specific Rényi entropy of the string source with parameter
, . . . .
• From an inquisitor's point of view, there is a law of diminishing returns for the expected guesswork growth rate in excess number of users (V − U ). • From a designer's point of view, coming full circle to Massey's original observation that Shannon entropy has no quantitative relationship to how hard it is to guess a single string, the specific Shannon entropy of the source is a lower bound on the average guesswork growth rate for all V and U . These results generalize both the original guesswork studies, where U = V = 1, as well as some of the results in [11] , [13] where, as a wiretap model, the case U = 1 and V = 2 with one of the strings selected uniformly, is considered and scaling properties of the guesswork moments are established. Interestingly, we will show that that setting is one where the LDP rate function is typically non-convex, so while results regarding the asymptotic behavior of the guesswork moments can be deduced from the LDP, the reverse is not true. Instead, we prove the main result using the contraction principle, Theorem 4.2.1 [14] , and the LDP established in [8] , which itself relies on earlier results of work referenced above.
III. A FIRST EXAMPLE
As an exemplar that illustrates the reduction in security that comes from having multiple users, the left panel in Figure 1 the average guesswork growth rate for an asymptotically optimal strategy is plotted for the simplest case, a binary alphabet with V i.i.d. Bernoulli string sources. In order to be satisfied, the inquisitor wishes to identify U ≤ V of the strings. The x-axis shows the excess number of guessable strings, V − U , and the y-axis is the log 2 growth rate of the expected guesswork in string length. If the source is perfectly uniform (i.e. characters are chosen with a Bernoulli 1/2 process), then the average guesswork growth rate is maximal and unchanging in V − U . If the source is not perfectly uniform, then the growth rate decreases as the number of excess guessable strings V − U increases, with a lower bound of the source's Shannon entropy.
For a string of length 168 bits, as used in the triple DES cipher, and a Bernoulli (0.25) source, the right panel in Figure  1 displays the impact that the change in this exponent has, approximately, on the average number of guesses required to determine U strings. More refined results for a broader class of processes can be found in later sections, including an estimate on the guesswork distribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section IV, we begin with a brief overview of results on guesswork that we have not touched on so far. Questions of optimal strategy are considered in Section V. Asymptotically optimal strategies are established to exist in Section VI and results for these strategies appear in Section VII. In Section VIII we present examples where strings sources have distinct statistics. In Section IX we return to the setting where string sources have identical statistics. Concluding remarks appear in Section X.
IV. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GUESSWORK
Since Arikan's introduction of the long string length asymptotic, several generalizations of its fundamental assumptions have been explored. Arikan and Boztas [15] investigate the setting where the truthfulness in response to a query is not certain. Arikan and Merhav [16] loosens the assumption that inquisitor needs to determine the string exactly, assuming instead that they only need to identify it within a given distance. That the inquisitor knows the distribution of words exactly is relaxed by Sundaresan [17] , [18] .
Motivated by a wiretap application, the problem of multiple users was first investigated by Merhav and Arikan [11] in the V = 2 and U = 1 setting, assuming one of the users selects their string uniformly on a reduced alphabet. In [19] Hayashi and Yamamoto extend the results in [11] to the case if there is an additional i.i.d. source correlated to the first, used for coding purposes, while Harountunian and Ghazaryan [20] extend the results in [11] to the setting of [16] . Harountunian and Margaryan [21] expand on [11] by adding noise to the original string, altering the distribution of letters. Hanawal and Sundaresan [13] extend the bounds in [11] to a pre-limit and to more general sources, showing that they are tight for Markovian and unifilar sources.
Sundaresan [22] uses length functions to identify the link between guesswork and compression. This result is extended by Hanawal and Sundaresan [23] to relate guesswork to the compression of a source over a countably infinite alphabet. In [2] the authors prove that if the string is conditioned on being an element of a typical set the expected guesswork is growing slower than a simple uniform approximation would suggest. In [24] the authors consider the impact of guessing over a noisy erasure channel showing that the mean noise on the channel is not the significant moment in determining the expected guesswork, but instead one determined by its Rényi entropy with parameter 1/2.
V. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
Before introducing the multi-user strategy we will analyze, in order to discuss optimality, we first revisit the question for
Definition 1: A single user strategy, S : A k → {1, . . . , m k }, is a one-to-one map that determines the order in which guesses are made. That is, for a given strategy S and a given string w ∈ A k , S(w) is the number of guesses made before w is queried.
Let W k be a random variable taking values in A k . Assume that its probability mass function, P (W k = w) for all w ∈ A k , is known. Since the first results on the topic it has been clear that the best strategy, which we denote G, is to guess from most likely to least likely, breaking ties arbitrarily. In particular, G is defined by G(w) < G(w ) if and only if P (W k = w) > P (W k = w ). We begin by assigning optimality a precise meaning in terms of stochastic dominance [25] , [26] .
This definition captures the stochastic aspect of guessing by stating than an optimal strategy is one where the identification stopping time is probabilistically smallest. One consequence of this definition that explains its appropriateness is that for any monotone function φ : {1, . . . , m k } → R, it is the case that E(φ(S(W k ))) ≤ E(φ(S (W k ))) for an optimal S and any other S (e.g. Proposition 3.3.17, [26] ). Thus S(W k ) has the least moments over all guessing strategies. That guessing from mostto least-likely in the single user case is optimal is readily established by induction.
Lemma 1: If V = U = 1, the optimal strategies are those that guess from most likely to least likely, breaking ties arbitrarily.
In the multi-user case, where (user, string) pairs are queried, a strategy is defined by the following.
. . , V m k } that orders the guesses of (user, string) pairs.
The expression for the number of guesses required to identify U strings is a little involved as we must take into account that we stop making queries about a user once their string has been identified. For a given strategy S, let
which computes the number of queries in the strategy up to n that correspond to user v.
The number of queries that need to be made if U strings are to be identified is
This apparently unwieldy object counts the number of queries made to each user, curtailed either when their own string is identified or when U strings of other users are identified.
the sum of the number of queries required to identify each individual word. In this case, we have the analogous result to Lemma 1, which is again readily established. Lemma 2: If V = U , the optimal strategies are those that employ individual optimal strategies, but with users selected in any order.
The formula (1) will be largely side-stepped when we consider asymptotically optimal strategies, but is needed to establish that there is, in general, no stochastically dominant strategy
k ) being a random vector taking values in A kV with independent, not necessarily identically distributed, components, we are not guaranteed the existence of an S such that P (G S (U, V, W k ) ≤ n) ≥ (G S (U, V, W k ) ≤ n) for all alternate strategies S . If a stochastically dominant strategy exists, its first guess must be user 1, string 0, i.e. S(1, 0) = 1, so that P (G S (1, W 1 ) = 1) = 0.6. Given this first guess, to maximize P (G S (1, W 1 ) ≤ 2), the second guess must be user 1, string 1, S(1, 1) = 2, so that P (G S (1, W 1 ) ≤ 2) = 0.85.
An alternate strategy with S(2, 0) = 1 and S(2, 1) = 2, however, gives P (G S (1, W 1 ) = 1) = 0.5 and P (G S (1, W 1 ) ≤ 2) = 0.9. While P (G S (1, W 1 ) = 1) > P (G S (1, W 1 ) = 1), P (G S (1, W 1 ) ≤ 2) < P (G S (1, W 1 ) ≤ 2) and so there is no strategy stochastically dominated by all others in this case.
Despite this lack of universal optimal strategy, we will show that there is a sequence of random variables that are stochastically dominated by the guesswork of all strategies and, moreover, there exists a strategy whose performance is identical to it in the large deviation asymptotic as string-length grows.
Definition 4: A strategy S is asymptotically optimal if {k −1 log G S (U, V, W k )} satisfies a LDP with the same rate function as any sequence
Note that Υ(U, V, ·) need not correspond to the guesswork of a strategy.
VI. AN ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL STRATEGY
Let { W k } be a sequence of random strings, with W k taking values in A kV , with independent components, W
k , corresponding to strings selected by users 1 through V , although each user's string not be constructed from i.i.d. letters. For each individual user, v ∈ {1, . . . , V } let G (v) denote its single-user optimal guessing strategy; that is, guessing from most likely to least likely.
We will show that the following random variable, constructed using the G (v) , is stochastically dominated by the guesswork distribution of all strategies:
This can be thought of as allowing the inquisitor to query, for each n in turn, the n th most likely string for all users while only accounting for a single guess and so it does not correspond to an allowable strategy. Lemma 4: For any strategy S and any U ∈ {1, . . . , V }, G opt (U, V, W k ) is stochastically dominated by G S (U, V, W k ). That is, for any any U ∈ {1, . . . , V } and any n ∈ {1, . . . , m k }
Proof: Using equation (1) and the positivity of its summands, for any strategy S
is stochastically dominated by all other strategies,
Using equation (2), this implies that
The strategy that we construct that will asymptotically meet the performance of the lower bound is to round-robin the single user optimal strategies. That is, to query the most likely string of one user followed by the most likely string of a second user and so forth, for each user in a round-robin fashion, before moving to the second most likely string of each user. An upper bound on this strategy's performance is to consider only stopping at the end of a round of such queries, even if they reveal more than U strings, which gives
where G opt (U, V, W k ) is defined in (2) . In large deviations parlance the stochastic processes {k −1 log G opt (U, V, W k )} and {k −1 log(V G opt (U, V, W k ))} arising from equations (2) and (3) are exponentially equivalent, e.g. Section 4.2.2 [14] , as lim k→∞ k −1 log V = 0. As a result, if one process satisfies the LDP with a rate function that has compact level sets, then the other does [14] [Theorem 4.2.3]. Thus if {k −1 log G opt (U, V, W k )} can be shown to satisfy a LDP, then the round-robin strategy is proved to be asymptotically optimal.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE OF OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
We first recall what is known for the single-user setting. For each individual user v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, the specific Rényi entropy of the sequence {W
for β ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞), and for β = 1,
the specific Shannon entropy. Should R (v) (β) exist for β ∈ (0, ∞) then the specific min-entropy is defined to be R (v) (∞) and the limit necessarily exists
The existence of R (v) (β) for all β > 0 and its relationship to the scaled cumulant generating function
has been established for the single user case for a broad class of character sources that encompasses i.i.d., Markovian and general sofic shifts that admit an entropy condition [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . If, in addition, R (v) (β) is differentiable and has a continuous derivative, it is established in [8] that the process
In [8] , this LDP is used to deduce an approximation to the guesswork distribution,
for large k and n ∈ {1, . . . , m k }.
The following theorem establishes the fundamental analogues of these results for an asymptotically optimal strategy, where user strings may have distinct statistical properties.
Theorem 5: Assume that the components of { W k } are independent and that for each v ∈ {1, . . . , V } R (v) (β) exists for all β > 0, is differentiable and has a continuous derivative, and that equation (4) holds. Then the process {k −1 log G opt (U, V, W k )}, and thus any asymptotically optimal strategy, satisfies a large deviation principle. Defining
which is lower semi-continuous and has compact level sets, but may not be convex. The sCGF capturing how the moments scale is
Proof: As U-min : R V → R can be readily shown to be a continuous function, that a LDP holds follows from an application of the contraction principle, e.g. Theorem 4.2.1 [14] , giving the rate function
This expression simplifies to that in equation (7) by elementary arguments. The sCGF result follows from an application of Varahadan's Lemma, e.g Theorem 4.3.1 [14] .
The reason for using the notation I Gopt (U, V, ·) in lieu of Λ * Gopt (U, V, ·) for the rate function in Theorem 5 is that I Gopt (U, V, ·) is not convex in general, which we will demonstrate by example, and so is not always the Legendre-Fenchel transform of the sCGF Λ Gopt (U, V, ·). Instead
forms the convex hull of I Gopt (U, V, ·). In particular, this means that we could not have proved Theorem 5 by establishing properties of Λ Gopt (U, V, ·) alone, which was the successful route taken for the U = V = 1 setting, and instead needed to rely on the LDP proved in [8] . Indeed, in the setting considered in [11] , [13] with U = 1, V = 2, with one of the strings is chosen uniformly, while the authors directly identify Λ Gopt (1, 2, α) for α > 0, one cannot establish a full LDP from this approach as the resulting rate function is not convex. Convexity is ensured, however, if all users select using the same stochastic properties, whereupon the results in Theorem 5 simplify greatly. 
where R(1) is the specific Shannon entropy, and the sCGF in equation (8) simplifies to
In particular, with α = 1 we have
where R((n + 1)/(n + 2)) − R((n + 2)/(n + 3)) is a decreasing function of n ∈ N. Proof: The simplification in equation (9) follows readily from equation (7) . To establish that R((n + 1)/(n + 2)) − R((n + 2)/(n + 3)) is a decreasing function of n ∈ N, it suffices to establish that R((x + 1)/(x + 2)) is a convex, decreasing function for x ∈ R + .
That R(x) ↓ R(1) as x ↑ 1 is a general property of specific Rényi entropy. For convexity, using equation (11) it suffices to show that xΛ G (1/x) is convex for x > 0. This can be seen by noting that for any a ∈ (0, 1) and x 1 , x 2 > 0,
where η = ax 1 /(ax 1 + (1 − a)x 2 ) ∈ (0, 1) and we have used the convexity of Λ G . As the growth rate, R((n + 1)/(n + 2)) − R((n + 2)/(n + 3)) is decreasing there is a law of diminishing returns for the inquisitor where the greatest decrease in the average guesswork growth rate is through the provision of one additional user.
From the system designer's point of view, the specific Shannon entropy of the source is a universal lower bound on the exponential growth rate of the expected guesswork that, while we cannot take the limit to infinity, is tight for large V − U .
Regardless of whether the rate function I Gopt (U, V, ·) is convex, Theorem 6, which follows, justifies the approximation
for large k and n ∈ {1, . . . , m k }. It is analogous to that in equation (6), first developed in [8] , but there are additional difficulties that must be overcome to establish it. In particular, if U = V = 1, the likelihood that the string is identified is decreasing per guess, but this is not true in the more general case. As a simple example, consider U = V = 2, A = {0, 1}, strings of length 1 and strings chosen uniformly. Here the probability of guessing both strings in one guess is 1/4, but at the second guess it is 3/4. Despite this lack of monotonicity, the approximation still holds in the following sense. 
Proof: The proof follows the ideas in [8] Corollary 4, but with the added difficulty resolved. To overcome this issue, one isolates the last word that is likely to be guessed and leverages the monotonicity it its individual likelihood of being identified.
Define the collection of guesses made in a log-neighborhood of x to be K k (x, ) = {n : n ∈ (exp(k(x − )), exp((k(x + )))} and consider for x ∈ (0, log(m)) sup n∈K k (x, ) 
Considering the least likely guesswork in the ball leads to a matching lower bound. The other case, x = 0, follows similar logic, leading to the result. We next provide some illustrative examples of what these results imply, returning to using log 2 in figures.
VIII. MISMATCHED STATISTICS EXAMPLE
The potential lack of convexity in the rate function of Theorem 5, equation (7), only arises if users' string statistics are asymptotically distinct. The significance of this lack of convexity on the phenomenology of guesswork can be understood in terms of the asymptotically optimal round-robin strategy: if the rate function is not convex, there is no single set of users whose strings are most vulnerable.
That is, if U strings are recovered after a small number of guesses, they will be from one set of users, but after a number of guesses corresponding to a transition from the initial convexity they will be from another set of users. This is most readily illustrated by an example that falls within the two-user setting of [11] , where one string is constructed from uniformly from i.i.d. bits and the other string from non-uniformly selected i.i.d. bytes.
Let A = {0, . . . , 7}, U = 1 and V = 2. Let one character source correspond to the output of a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator. That is, despite having a byte alphabet, the source produces perfectly uniform i.i.d. bits, (1) * (x), the large deviations rate function for guessing the uniform bit string. The the convex function starting below it is Λ G
(2) * (x), the rate function for guessing the non-uniform byte string. The highlighted line, which is the minimum of the two rate functions until x = 1 and then +∞ afterwards, displays I Gopt (1, 2, x), as determined by (7), the rate function for an inquisitor to guess one of the two strings. Its non-convexity demonstrates that initially it is the bytes that are most likely to be revealed by brute force searching, but eventually it is the uniform bits that are more likely to be identified. The Legendre-Fenchel transform of the scaled cumulant generating function of the guesswork distributions would form the convex hull of the highlighted line and so this could not be deduced by analysis of the asymptotic moments.
The other source can be thought of as i.i.d. bytes generated by a non-uniform source,
This models the situation of a piece of data, a string from the second source, being encrypted with a shorter, perfectly uniform key. The inquisitor can reveal the hidden string by guessing either the key or the string. One might suspect that either the key or the string is necessarily more susceptible to being guessed, but the result is more subtle. Figure 2 plots the rate functions for guessing each of the user's strings individually as well as the rate function for guessing one out of two, determined by equation (7), which in this case is the minimum of the two rate function where they are finite. The y-axis is the exponential decay-rate in string length k of the likelihood of identification given approximately exp(kx) guesses, where x is on the x-axis, have been made. The rate function reveals that if the inquisitor identifies one of the strings quickly, it will be the non-uniform byte string, but after a certain number of guesses it is the key, the uniform bit string, that is identified.
Attempting to obtain this result by taking the Legendre Fenchel transform of the sCGF identified in [11] results in the convex hull of this non-convex function, which has no real meaning. This explains the necessity for the distinct proof approach taken here if one wishes to develop estimates on the guesswork distribution rather than its moments.
IX. IDENTICAL STATISTICS EXAMPLES
When the string statistics of users are asymptotically the same, the resulting multi-user guesswork rate functions are convex by Corollary 1, and the rôle of specific Shannon entropy in analyzing expected multi-user guesswork appears. This is the setting that leads to the results in Section III where it is assumed that character statistics are i.i.d., but not necessarily uniform.
An alternate means of departure from string-selection uniformity is that the appearance of characters within the string may be correlated. The simplest model of this is where string symbols are governed by a Markov chain with arbitrary starting distribution and transition matrix
where a, b ∈ (0, 1). The specific Rényi entropy of this character source can be evaluated, e.g. [5] , for β = 1 to be 1) the difference between the average guesswork growth rate for a single user system versus one for an arbitrarily large number of users as a and b are varied. Heavily correlated sources or those with unlikely characters give the greatest discrepancy in security. If a = b, then the stationary likelihood a symbol is a 0 or 1 is equal, but symbol occurrence is correlated. In that setting, the string source's specific Rényi entropy gives for β = 1
which is the same as a Bernoulli source with probability a of one character. Thus the results in Section III can be re-read with the Bernoulli string source substituted for a Markovian string source whose stationary distribution gives equal weight to both alphabet letters, but for which character appearance is correlated.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Since Massey [3] posed the original guesswork problem and Arikan [4] introduced its long string asymptotic, generalizations have been used to quantify the computational security of several systems, including being related to questions of loss-less compression. Here we have considered what appears to be one of the most natural extensions of that theory, that of multi-user computational security. As a consequence of the inherent non-convex nature of the guesswork rate functions unless string source statistics are equal for all users, this development wasn't possible prior to the large deviation principle proved in [8] .
The results therein themselves relied on the earlier work that determined the scaled cumulant generating function for the guesswork for a broad class of process [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] .
The fact that rate functions can be non-convex encapsulates that distinct subsets of users are likely to be identified depending on how many unsuccessful guesses have been made. As a result, a simple ordering of string guessing difficulty is inappropriate in multi-user systems and suggests that quantification of multi-user computational security is inevitably nuanced.
The original analysis of the asymptotic behavior of single user guesswork identified an operational meaning to specific Rényi entropy. In particular, the average guesswork grows exponentially in string length with an exponent that is the specific Rényi entropy of the character source with parameter 1/2. When users' string statistics are the same, the generalization to multi-user guesswork identifies a surprising operational rôle for specific Rényi entropy with parameter n/(n + 1) for each n ∈ N when n is the excess number of strings that can be guessed. Moreover, while the specific Shannon entropy of the string source was found in the single user problem to have an unnatural meaning as the growth rate of the expected logarithm of the guesswork, in the multi-user system it arises as the universal lower bound on the average guesswork growth rate.
For the asymptote at hand, it appears that the key message is that there is a law of diminishing returns for an inquisitor as the number of users increases. For a system designer, it would appear that Shannon entropy is an appropriate measure of guesswork after all.
